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EMERGENCY AT 35’000 FT.:
HOW COCKPIT AND CABIN CREWS LEAD EACH OTHER TO SAFETY
Bienefeld, Nadine
ETH Zurich
&
Grote, Gudela
ETH Zurich
Many aircraft accidents have illustrated the catastrophic consequences of ineffective leadership.
However, the optimal form of leadership during emergencies on board is not yet fully explored,
particularly not with regards to its influence on decision making. Several authors have studied
decision making errors in the cockpit, but to our knowledge so far, nobody has considered the
role of the cabin crew, who in these stressful and challenging circumstances have to closely
collaborate with pilots despite obvious differences in their training and culture. This study
investigates the influence of collective leadership on the quality of decision making by observing
84 cockpit and cabin crews (N=504) live during a simulated emergency. Results indicate that
collective leadership strongly correlates with the quality of the decision and crew performance.
To conclude, we discuss the implications of those results for decision making in aviation and
recommend changes in the design and content of CRM training.

In the past two decades, we have learnt much about
decision making under stress and the potential for human
error (e.g. Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993;
Klein, 1993, 1997; Flin, Salas, Strub & Martin, 1997).
The importance of leadership in effective teamwork is
Studies in the domain of aviation have revealed interesting
acknowledged without controversy (see Yukl, 2006 for an
results with regards to traps for errors in decision making
overview) and leadership is even more relevant where
particularly in emergency situations where pilots have to
evidently it matters most: in the face of life-threatening
make vital decisions which determine the fate of everybody
hazards and stressful situations as encountered during an
on board (e.g. Orasanu, Dismukes, & Fischer, 1993;
emergency on board an aircraft (Baran & Scott, 2010;
Orasanu, 1994; Orasanu & Serfaty, 1996; Orasanu &
Yammarino, Mumford, Connelly, & Dionne, 2010).
Fischer, 1997; Orasanu & Lynne, 1998).
Recent studies have shown that collective leadership,
In this paper we will investigate decision making during
defined as an ongoing reciprocal interactions process among
a simulated emergency on board and the way in which
all team members regardless of their formal organisational
rank or authority has positive effects on team performance. leadership influences the quality of the decision as well as
the overall crew performance.
Baran & Scott (2010) for instance, have concluded from
their observations of fire fighting teams, that collective
Based on what we know about the positive effects of
leadership was most effective in dynamic, stressful and
collective leadership described above, we recorded
dangerous situations because one single hierarchical leader
leadership behaviour in both formal leaders, i.e. captains
could not attend to all the required leadership tasks by him- and informal leaders, i.e. cabin crew members.
or herself at once. Similar conclusions were found in
To our knowledge cabin crew members have not yet
medical action and anaesthesia teams where both formally
been included in studies on decision making or leadership
assigned leaders and informal leaders fulfilled leadership
despite the fact that they play a crucial role in an emergency
tasks and thereby increased team performance (e.g. Klein,
and have to closely collaborate with pilots taking part in the
Ziegert, Knight, & Xiao, 2006; Künzle, Zala-Mezö, Wacker, decision making process. Several aircraft accidents have
Kolbe, & Grote, 2009; Xiao, Seagull, Mackenzie, & Klein,
tragically illustrated what can go wrong when this
2004; Yun, Faraj, & Henry, 2005).
collaboration fails. For instance in 1983, 23 people on board
Decision making is described as one of the most
Air Canada flight 797 were killed after smoke and fire in the
important leadership tasks and decision quality is often used cabin became uncontrollable after a tardy and ineffective
as a direct outcome measure of the leadership process
decision making process involving both pilots and cabin
(Vroom & Jago, 1974; Yukl, 2006).
crew members. Due to incomplete information and
Introduction

misunderstandings, pilots had underestimated the risk posed
by the smoke in the cabin whereupon they delayed the
decision and lost vital time. Had the captain or in fact any
other crew member on this eventful flight fulfilled some of
the most basic leadership tasks such as maintaining an
overview of the situation, supervising or correcting the
actions of the other crew members, the decision
effectiveness and hence the overall outcome could have
been very different (TSBC, 1983).
For this study we have created a similar scenario in
which cockpit and cabin crews, due to differing information
and closed cockpit door, had to all contribute in order to
reach the correct decision (Vroom & Jago, 1974). In that
way we were able to observe 504 cockpit and cabin crew
members live in a simulator with regards to their leadership
behaviour, whereby we followed the functional team
leadership theory (Zaccaro, Rittman, & Marks 2001) and
classified leadership according to Yukl’s leadership
taxonomy (2006).

against 21% male). Anonymity of all participants was
guaranteed.
Procedure
The observations took place during a simulated
emergency exercise in the A320 cabin flight simulator
which was part of the annual safety training day at the
respective airline.
Each crew performed a standardized flight during which
they had to deal with an onboard emergency of a critical
nature while three trained observers recorded frequencies of
various leadership behaviours as described below.
Directly after completion of the simulated flight two
independent subject matter experts and safety instructors
completed a team performance evaluation form and subjects
were asked to fill in a questionnaire to collect team process
variables, control variables and biographical information.
Following this all participants received a training
oriented debriefing.

Hypotheses
We derive our assumption from the theory described
above and postulate the following hypotheses:
H1: In crews with correct decision making, the overall
crew performance is significantly higher than in crews with
faulty decision making.
H2: In crews with correct decision making, the overall
amount of leadership is significantly higher than in crews
with faulty decision making.
H3: Only in crews with correct decision making does
collective leadership, i.e. leadership demonstrated by formal
leaders (captains = CMDs) as well as leadership shown by
informal leaders (cabin crew members = CCMs)
significantly predict crew performance.
Methods

Apparatus
The Airbus A320 cabin flight simulator is a special form
of high fidelity simulator equipped with a two-man cockpit
and a fully furnished passenger cabin seating up to 20
passengers, thus creating a realistic environment for crossdisciplinary mixed team training.
Using hydraulic mechanisms various airplane
movements can be simulated and the training of emergency
situations is enabled through different manipulations such as
system malfunctions, alarms, smoke etc.
To further increase face validity the cabin flight
simulator is equipped with the original intercommunication
system, cabin signs and emergency equipment. Realistic
audio simulation and background noises facilitate further
immersion into the experience.

Participants

Scenario

A total of 504 cockpit and cabin crew members (84
crews) of a medium sized European airline voluntarily
participated in this study, whereby participants had been
chosen randomly depending on their flight schedule.
Flight experience of captains varied from nine to 37
years (M = 26.18, SD = 5.19) and from one year to a
maximum of 31 years for first officers (M = 13.08, SD =
6.68). Cabin crew members had between 11 months and 37
years (M = 19.44, SD = 7.99) of professional experience.
The age of the participants followed a normal distribution
with an average of 50 years for captains, 39 years for first
officers and 36 years for cabin crew members. There was a
significant sub-group specific gender bias (cockpit crew
100% male and cabin crew predominantly female with 79%

For the purpose of this study a specific 20 minutes long
standardized scenario was created in which pilots, due to
physical separation (closed cockpit door), had to base their
decision making on the information they received from the
cabin crew. The situation began with a normal course of
flight which then developed into a critical emergency
situation. While pilots had no indication of a problem in the
cockpit throughout the entire exercise, smoke started to
develop in the cabin, gradually intensifying. The scenario
was developed by the first author together with two subject
matter experts and validated by one training captain and
seven safety instructors.
Face validity of the scenario was rated as high by 86% of
all participants, indicating that they felt the scenario was

realistic, that they acted accordingly and that they believed
that a real crew would act in the same way.

Results

First the data was tested for potential influencing factors
such as job experience, experience in a formal leadership
position, age and gender. None of them showed significant
Leadership behaviour was coded by means of a
effects on the statistical models.
leadership taxonomy based on Yukl’s categorical system of
All data collected from first officers was excluded from
14 managerial position duties and responsibilities (Yukl,
the analyses because interactions between cockpit and cabin
2006) and recorded by means of event sampling in real time,
crews took place between captains and cabin crew members
using TrackVivo ©, a data sampling software (SmarTrack,
exclusively.
2009).
To compare the leadership and overall performance in
Observers and interrater agreement. The first author
crews whose decision making was correct (N=63) with the
and three undergraduate psychology majors with current or
performance in crews whose decision making was faulty
past background as cockpit or cabin crew served as on-site
(N=21), we computed two independent t-tests which
observers.
revealed the following results:
To check the accuracy of coding 10% of data (10 crews)
On average, the overall performance in crews with
were recorded on video and double coded. Cohen’s kappa
correct decision making was higher (M = 4.68, SE =.14)
for the different leadership codes ranged from κ = .82
than in crews with faulty decision making (M =3.71, SE =
(consulting others) to κ = 1.0 (delegate sth. to sb.),
.37). This difference was significant t (82) = 2.88, p < .01.
indicating excellent interrater reliability.
With regards to leadership we also found significant
differences
between the groups (t (82) = 2.14, p = .03)
Performance measure
whereby crews who reached the correct decision
demonstrated more leadership in total (M = 5.86, SE = .53)
Performance was assessed by two trained safety
than crews who made a faulty decision (M = 4.60, SE = .28).
instructors and subject matter experts.
For the purpose of identifying the influence of leadership
For this purpose, a checklist based and time sensitive
and weighted performance rating system was developed and on performance in dependency of the quality of decision
making, we split the data by the variable ‘decision making’
validated using Delphi Technique (Clayton, 1997) this
rating system was validated by 5 safety experts (experience (correct vs. faulty) and computed a hierarchical regression
model. As demonstrated in table 1, leadership of captains,
> 10 years) over the course of three discussion rounds.
entered as a first factor, was a significant predictor for
performance in crews who made the correct decision
Decision making
(SEB p = .043) but not in crews
The correctness of the decision was assessed by a safety with faulty decision making (SEB
instructor and subject matter expert and consisted of one
ns). Similarly, leadership demonstrated by cabin
dichotomous variable (Did the pilots reach the correct
crew members, entered as a second factor, significantly
decision within the predefined time frame? Yes or No). If
predicted performance (SEB p =
the correct decision was reached but the critical point in
.009), but again only in crews who reached the correct
time had passed, the decision was rated as wrong because
decision. However, this significant second factor effect
according to the given scenario, a successful landing would reduced the influence of captains’ leadership, making it
not have been possible anymore.
statistically insignificant (SEB p
Orasanu & Lynne (1998) point out that in real life
= .08). Contrary to our expectation, the interaction effects
scenarios, there is often no clear standard of “correctness”
between predictors one and two were statistically
and that the “best” decision may not be well defined. This is insignificant.
why we chose a scenario which was very simple in this
respect. If the information (location, colour, density,
development, smell of smoke) was correctly passed on to
the pilots, the correct decision could be reached by means of
recognition-primed-decision making (RPDM) (Klein, 1993).
All subsequent actions were fully under control of the pilots
and could be carried out in accordance with the
corresponding emergency procedures. If the information
received from the cabin was incomplete however, there was
significant potential for misunderstanding.
Leadership

making process (Vroom & Jago, 1974; Yukl, 2006). Our
results demonstrate that significantly more leadership was
displayed during the decision making process in crews who
reached the correct decision. Furthermore, leadership was a
Hierarchical regression model for the effect of
significant predictor for crew performance, but only in
leadership on crew performance in dependency of the
crews who had reached the appropriate decision. This effect
quality of decision making (decision correct vs. decision
was insignificant in crews with erroneous decision making.
wrong)
The more interesting result however is that not only
formal leadership (demonstrated by captains) correlated
Decision correct
strongly with performance in crews with good decision
Crew performance
making, but informal leadership (demonstrated by cabin
crew members) correlated even more strongly with crew
predictors
B
SEB

t
Sig.
performance.
These findings contribute to the ongoing research on the
Step 1
effectiveness of collective leadership and go in line with
(Constant)
21.11
5.12
4.12
.000
what others (e.g. Baran & Scott, 2010; Klein et al., 2006;
Leadership CMD
-1.78
0.92
-.22
-1.93
.043*
Künzle et al., Xiao et al., 2004) have observed in similarly
Step 2
structured teams, implicating a change in the traditional
(Constant)
-2.44
10.09
-0.24
.810
leadership paradigm where leadership is seen as centralized
Leadership CMD
-1.55
0.89
-.19
-1.75
.084
within one single hierarchical leader (see Yukl, 2006 for an
Leadership CCM
4.34
1.62
.29
2.67
.009** overview).
(Constant)
-3.62
18.06
-0.20
.842
The call for proactive participation and support in the
leadership process by informal leaders however will not be
Leadership CMD
-1.33
3.00
-.16
-0.44
.659
adequately answered if crew members lack the necessary
Leadership CCM
4.58
3.52
.31
1.30
.196
knowledge, skills and attitudes. Should the active
LS CMD * LS CCM
-0.05
0.60
-.03
-.08
.937
participation of so called ‘followers’ in the decision making
N
84
and leadership process continue to demonstrate positive
effects on performance, the implications for training would
be great in that every crew member would have to be trained
Decision incorrect
to effectively execute some of the necessary leadership
Crew performance
tasks. Before that is the case though, more research on the
subject is needed and potential negative effects (e.g.
predictors
B
SEB

t
Sig. competing leaders creating chaos and diffusion of
responsibility) need to be considered.
step 1
What we suggest instead is that cockpit and cabin crews
(Constant)
11.17
14.23
0.78
.453 should each act as a system of redundancy within and
Leadership CMD
-2.13
2.30
-.30
-0.93
.376 between themselves in correspondence with the credo of
step 2
‘Crew Resource Management’ (CRM) in that all available
(Constant)
-12.34
16.04
-0.77
.464 resources of the crew should be used for the purpose of a
Leadership CMD
-3.32
1.99
-.46
-1.66
.135 safe and efficient flight operation (e.g. Helmreich, et al.,
Leadership CCM
6.55
2.99
.61
2.19
.060 1999).
(Constant)
13.51
37.48
0.36
.729
Specifically we propose that the importance of
Leadership CMD
-7.97
6.40
-1.11
-1.25
.253 leadership and decision making be addressed in CRMLeadership CCM
.50
8.46
.05
0.06
.955 training involving both cockpit and cabin crews. All crew
LS CMD*LS CCM
1.05
1.37
.99
0.77
.468 members should be given the opportunity to train the skills
N
84
and behaviours that are needed for effective
interdisciplinary collaboration in an emergency by having to
interact with each other during task-oriented, practical
Note: CMD = Commander, CCM = Cabin Crew Member
training sessions using realistic scenarios.
Table 1.

Discussion
This study offers some new evidence to strengthen the
notion that leadership plays a crucial role in the decision

Limitations
The sample was drawn from only one airline and in only
one industry. Although this controls for the influence of

contextual issues, it raises the issue that the results may not
generalize to other organizational contexts. Given the
structural similarity of teams working in other high risk
environments such as medicine, policing or fire fighting, we
would argue however, that these findings are transferable
and may have important implications also for their training.
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